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This chapter argues that Schopenhauer’s political philosophy, on the one hand, is 
conservative in character, while his moral philosophy, on the other, has progressive 
applications to social and political life. While this is not inconsistent in itself, it does 
confound Schopenhauer’s expectation that the norms of political justice converge on 




On 18 September, 1848, as revolutionary violence raged on the streets of Frankfurt-am-Main, 
Schopenhauer (with some eagerness) allowed a troop of Austrian soldiers to use his second 
floor apartment as a convenient higher ground for picking off the troublesome rebels below. 
When the troop moved to a neighboring house for a better vantage point, Schopenhauer sent 
after them his opera glasses. This, Schopenhauer’s single intervention in the wave of uprisings 
and attempted revolutions that swept across Germany and the rest of Europe in 1848 and 1849, 
was echoed in his decision to bequeath most of his estate to a charitable fund set up for “the 
support of the Prussian soldiers who fought for the maintenance and restoration of legal order 
in Germany” and the dependents of the soldiers killed.1 It also neatly illustrates the general 
outlook of his political philosophy: on the side of preserving the established political order, on 
the grounds of keeping the peace, from a fear-tinged position of relative security. 
Schopenhauer’s contribution to political philosophy is surely the least studied of all his 
contributions to the major strands of Western philosophy.2 However, it would not be unfair to 
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suggest that this is a problem of Schopenhauer’s own making. For a start, the significance to 
which politics and political philosophy could possibly aspire within Schopenhauer’s system is 
severely limited by the depth of Schopenhauer’s ahistoricism. For Schopenhauer, nothing 
really changes; there is more to learn from the poetry of war, for instance, which represents to 
us the eternal volatility of human nature, than there is from the history of war, which merely 
records the order and details of human nature’s various fleeting manifestations (WWR I, 269-
275; WWR II, 439-446). If nothing really changes, then, a fortiori, politics changes nothing. It 
is no surprise, then, that Schopenhauer allocates just two sections (§§61-62) of the first volume 
of The World as Will and Representation to his political philosophy.3 Relatedly, the content of 
Schopenhauer’s political philosophy does not appear to aspire to make any major advances in 
the field. In spite of some subtle and important differences, and some potential theoretical 
gains, on the whole, Schopenhauer fits fairly neatly into the lineage of Hobbes and Locke, as 
a natural law theorist and common-sense advocate of the social contract. 
There is, however, an important exception to the relative quiet and unconcern about 
Schopenhauer’s political philosophy – or, more precisely, Schopenhauer’s political character. 
Around the middle of the 20th century, following the rise of Nazism, many German-speaking 
intellectuals began to interpret and re-interpret the newly politicized history of German letters. 
György Lukács’ book The Destruction of Reason – a history and Marxist critique of 
irrationalist philosophy “from Schelling to Hitler,” in Lukács’ words – is a prime example in 
which Schopenhauer plays no small part.4 Schopenhauer was, in Lukács’ view, “the first 
irrationalist standing on a purely bourgeois foundation.” Thus, anecdotes such as the one at the 
beginning of this chapter were grist to Lukács’ mill.5 In particular, Lukács was suspicious of 
how Schopenhauer’s ahistoricism relegates the possibility of substantial political change, as 
mentioned above, as well as the ideological pathway that is suggested by a metaphysics in 
which the world is eternally tyrannized by a groundless, arational will.  
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By contrast, the second volume of Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies, in 
which it is Hegel, among other post-Kantians, who paves the way ideologically for future 
totalitarian regimes, casts Schopenhauer as an outside voice uniquely able and willing to speak 
truth to power. Popper does not undertake an analysis of Schopenhauer’s politics, much less 
Schopenhauer’s actual political philosophy, but he does repeatedly (and aptly) quote 
Schopenhauer’s multiple pronouncements on the malign influence that the Prussian state, under 
the reign of King Frederick William III, deliberately exerted upon intellectual honesty, rigor 
and freedom.6 
In this chapter, I shall be arguing that there is an element of truth to both Lukács’ and 
Popper’s conclusions about whether the political character of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is 
conservative or critical. It all begins with Schopenhauer’s strict separation of the incentive 
behind the institution of “temporal justice,” or in other words the state, from the incentive 
behind “voluntary justice.”7 The former incentive is egoism, which according to Schopenhauer 
has no moral significance, whereas the latter incentive is compassion, the basis of morality. 
On the one hand, I shall argue, due to its assertion that the fear of being wronged by 
another person is the sole motivation for the social contract upon which the state is founded, 
Schopenhauer’s political philosophy is seriously exposed to a well-known objection to 
contractarianism: that the contractarian’s sphere of concern extends only as far as groups who 
are already powerful and potentially threatening, and so to the exclusion of groups who are 
historically relatively powerless and vulnerable. Insofar as his political philosophy itself is 
concerned, then, Schopenhauer does indeed advocate an unsightly form of conservatism.  
On the other hand, however, I shall argue that Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy, which 
is not developed along contractarian lines, but is grounded in compassion with sufferers, 
concerns itself (not exclusively) with the same relatively powerless and vulnerable groups that 
his political philosophy overlooks, as evidenced by some of the examples that Schopenhauer 
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himself adduces as confirmation of his moral philosophy, such as the abolition of slavery and 
the animal welfare movement. Insofar as his broader ethics are concerned, then, 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy has progressive applications to political and social life.  
In other words, while the state may be merely a legal institution, according to 
Schopenhauer, and in several senses not a moral one, this very separation of the grounds of law 
from the grounds of morality allows that the state is not above external moral criticism. Toward 
the end of this chapter, I shall discuss the extent to which this heals the problem of exclusion 




I shall start by outlining two of the different species of justice distinguished by Schopenhauer: 
first “voluntary justice,” or justice as a moral virtue, and then “temporal justice,” or justice as 
political and legal practice, which I shall examine in greater detail.8 
Voluntary justice begins, naturally, with the difference between wrong and right. 
Wrong is defined by Schopenhauer as: “The violation of the boundaries of someone else’s 
affirmation of will” (WWR, I 360-361; see also OBM, 207-209; PP II, 217-218). In other 
words, to act wrongly is to pursue one’s own ends to such an extent that one encroaches upon 
the ends of another. From this general definition of wrong Schopenhauer derives a sample set 
of concrete wrongs, ranked according to the degree to which they cross the boundaries of 
someone else’s affirmation of will: 
 
[Wrong] expresses itself most perfectly … in cannibalism … After this comes murder 
… Intentionally mutilating or even injuring someone else’s body … can be seen as 
essentially the same as murder, differing only in degree. Wrongdoing manifests itself 
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further in the subjugation of other individuals, in forcing them into slavery, and finally 
in the assault on someone else’s property (WWR I, 361-362).9 
 
The last wrongdoing mentioned, assault on someone else’s property, counts as wrong in 
Schopenhauer’s book due to his labor-mixing theory of property. Property, according to 
Schopenhauer, “can only be what someone has worked on personally and put his energy into” 
(WWR I, 362) and is therefore an extension of a person’s will.10 Thus, pushing the point 
somewhat, Schopenhauer claims that assault on someone else’s property “is essentially the 
same as slavery” (WWR I 362), the difference between the two being merely a matter of 
degrees. Importantly, this makes the wrong of assault on someone else’s property as naturally 
wrong as an assault on their person, and not just wrong as a social or legal convention.11 
There are two different species of wrong, according to Schopenhauer: violence and 
cunning (WWR I, 363; OBM, 212-215). To act violently is to act wrongly by sheer brute force, 
whereas to act cunningly is to act wrongly “by supplying the other person’s will with illusory 
motives,” or in other words, to lie (WWR I, 363-364). They are, according to Schopenhauer, 
morally equivalent: what matters morally is the extent to which the boundaries of another 
individual’s affirmation of will are violated, not the means by which this is done, so neither 
violence nor cunning is morally worse in and of itself. Nevertheless, for extra-moral reasons, 
cunning is correctly perceived as being more “ignominious,” according to Schopenhauer, since 
violence merely debases material power, whereas cunning debases something far more 
valuable: trust. Thus: “Disloyalty and treachery tear apart this last external bond and give 
boundless scope to the consequences of egoism” (WWR I, 365).12  
Two further aspects of Schopenhauer’s definition of wrong will turn out to be highly 
important for his political philosophy. First, failure to fulfill an agreed contract fits the criteria 
of cunning: the will of one party to the contract is steered under pretenses of mutual benefit 
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that turn out to be, perhaps always were, false. Indeed, a broken contract is “the most perfect 
lie” (WWR I, 364), according to Schopenhauer. Whereas a regular lie merely misguides 
action,13 a broken contract actively extorts a pledge from the victim; the terms according to 
which her will is to be manipulated are drafted into it (OBM, 211). Second, any victim of wrong 
retains “a right of compulsion,” in other words, a right to use violence or cunning out of self-
defense (WWR I, 366-367).14 Schopenhauer derives this right from the very logic of his 
definition of wrong: when a person “encroaches on the sphere of the affirmation of will 
essential to my person as such, and in doing so negates it, my resisting this encroachment is 
just the negation of that negation, and to this extent nothing more on my part than the 
affirmation of the will” (WWR I, 366). A happy consequence of this derivation is that exercise 
of the right of compulsion is morally constrained in proportion to the extent of the wrongdoing 
to be resisted, since one is permitted to negate the original negation and no more. Putting these 
two together: the victim of a broken contract has a moral right to compel the perpetrator to 
fulfill it. 
A person exhibits voluntary justice, according to Schopenhauer, when she chooses to 
refrain from doing wrong for no other reason than that it is her inner inclination (WWR I, 397; 
OBM, 204-207). Since voluntary justice is concerned only with the wrongs from which one 
refrains, it is explicitly characterized by Schopenhauer as a negative virtue (OBM, 204). The 
concept of right itself is also essentially negative, according to Schopenhauer: it “contains only 
the negation of wrong, and it includes … any action that is not the negation of the other’s will 
through the stronger affirmation of my own” (WWR I, 365). The positive counterpart to justice, 
the virtue of loving kindness (Menschenliebe), describes the inclination actively to do good for 
another person, typically to assist her in overcoming her suffering,15 rather than merely to 
refrain from being its cause, and so is morally a step forward. Together, the virtues of justice 
and loving kindness correspond to the two parts of the “the highest principle of ethics” 
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according to Schopenhauer: Neminem laede; imo omnes, quantum potes, iuva (Harm no one; 
rather help everyone to the extent that you can). The principle as a whole, Schopenhauer thinks, 
describes the behavior of those who are guided by a sense of compassion, “the sole genuine 
moral incentive” (OBM, 197-203; see WWR I, 397-401).16 
 However, the inclination to act justly is not relatively the strongest inclination in a 
typical person’s moral psychology, according to Schopenhauer. The strongest and primary 
inclination is to act egoistically, that is, in such a way as to pursue one’s own ends and existence 
above all else (see WWR I, 357-359; OBM, 190-192). Egoism is the “natural perspective” 
(WWR I, 358), according to Schopenhauer, not just because every sentient creature, human 
beings included, has the will-to-life coursing through its veins.17 It is also because each of these 
creatures manifests the will-to-life in the form of a discrete subject. “In consequence of the 
subjectivity essential to each consciousness, each is for himself the whole world” (OBM, 190): 
thus, the annihilation of the ego is subjectively indistinguishable from the objective 
annihilation of the entire world, and hence, each “is ready to sacrifice all others for himself, 
ready to negate the world just to preserve his own self, this drop in the sea, for a little while 
longer” (WWR I 358). Where voluntary justice is inclined to refrain from transgressing the 
boundaries of another’s will, egoism is inclined to transgress any and every boundary, if doing 
so appears to be to its own advantage. 
 
Temporal justice: the political contract as the foundation of the state 
 
At this point, then, we turn from voluntary justice to “temporal justice,” which is the term that 
Schopenhauer uses – occasionally, idiosyncratically, but prominently – to encompass his 
political philosophy as a whole.18 
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The overwhelming ubiquity of egoism makes it inevitable that one will find oneself on 
the receiving end of some wrongdoing at some point, and thus makes desirable the protection 
afforded only by the political organized state. The state, therefore, arises “out of mutual fear of 
mutual force” (OBM, 192). Revealing some of his stripes as a political philosopher, 
Schopenhauer explicitly concurs with Hobbes that, in the absence of the state, human society 
would be a treacherous “war of all against all” (WWR I, 359; OBM, 192). 
Schopenhauer emphasizes how this marks the essential and important difference 
between morals and politics. “The pure doctrine of right” (Rechtslehre), according to which 
wrong is distinguished from right as above, is “a chapter in morals” insofar as it “relates directly 
and exclusively to what people do, not to what they suffer” (WWR I, 368). It is concerned with 
the inner significance of actions: whether they are performed out of compassion (Mitleid), 
egoism (Egoismus), or the third possible incentive, malice (Bosheit).19 By contrast, “political 
science [Staatslehre] … is exclusively concerned with suffering from wrong” (WWR I, 370). 
“It cares only about the deed,” according to Schopenhauer, “the only thing that the state takes 
to be real: the disposition, the intention is investigated only to the extent that it can shed light 
on the meaning of the deed” (WWR I 370-371). The political “theorist of rights” (Rechtslehrer) 
studies and devises the necessary measures to be taken in order to prevent and protect people 
from wrongful deeds, and is thus an “inverted moralist” (WWR I, 371; see also OBM, 209). 
The state is endowed with the legitimate right to prevent and protect the people from 
wrongful deeds by means of a contract founded upon the very egoism that would make the 
state of nature so volatile in the first place. Human beings, equipped with reason, are able to 
judge that it is in everybody’s interest, not least their own personal interests, “to spare everyone 
the pain of being wronged by having everyone also renounce the pleasure of doing it” (WWR 
I, 369). From this rational egoism arises “the political contract” (Staatsvertrag), an agreement 
not to commit wrong on the condition that one is spared from being wronged by others. The 
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state is not properly founded, according to Schopenhauer, until such a contract is agreed to by 
popular consent, which rules out despotism, in spite of its being a kind of social order which, 
in principle, may afford a kind of social peace, as much as it rules out the anarchy “of a 
collection of independent savages,” that is, the state of nature itself (WWR I, 370).  
 Nevertheless, even legitimate governments are imperfect, according to Schopenhauer: 
“Republics tend towards anarchy, monarchies towards despotism, and the constitutional 
monarchy, which was then devised as a middle ground, tends towards factional control” (WWR 
I, 370). Schopenhauer proposes the margin by which a given state successfully avoids such 
degeneration as a measure of its perfection. The least imperfect and most sustainable form of 
government, according to Schopenhauer, is a hereditary monarchy. Like any form of 
monarchy, hereditary monarchy tends toward despotism. What differentiates it from 
despotism, however, apart from popular consent, is that the monarch always acts in the public’s 
best interest. Schopenhauer mentions two ways in which this is achieved – which, it ought to 
be said, are neither convincing separately, nor fully coherent together. The first is that “having 
one family whose well-being is inseparable from that of the country” entails that “they cannot 
promote the one without the other” (WWR I, 370). This is another way of making egoism serve 
the public good. The second is that a monarch who is placed so high above the common people 
in terms of wealth, power, security and esteem, such that “the egoism that dwells in him, as in 
everyone, is annihilated, as it were, by neutralization” (WWR II, 595), will only concern 
himself with justice, for its own sake. In this case, monarchy is supposed to transcend egoism.20 
The state’s sole moral and legal remit, then, validated by the political contract of its 
citizens, is to protect its citizens from being wronged by one another. To do this, the state must 
prevent wrongful actions from occurring in the first place – not because it is legitimately 
interested in wrongful actions themselves, which go beyond its remit, but because of the 
necessary connection between someone’s doing wrong, on the one hand, and someone else’s 
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being wronged, on the other (WWR I, 370). The state achieves this, according to 
Schopenhauer, by means of the punishment of wrongdoing. 
 
Temporal justice: punishment 
 
Schopenhauer’s theory of punishment is a relatively well-developed branch of his political 
philosophy and a conduit for its principles. Punishment, for Schopenhauer, is yet another way 
of utilizing rational egoism for the public good. Since the virtue of voluntary justice cannot be 
counted on, rather than appealing to an appreciation of the inherent wrongfulness of certain 
actions, the law must instead appeal to citizens’ egoistic aversion to being wronged themselves. 
Accordingly, it is the job of state legislation “to counter every possible motive for wrongdoing 
with a stronger motive for failing to do wrong, in the form of inevitable punishment” (WWR 
I, 371). The substance of legislation should still be contoured by the pure doctrine of right, 
according to Schopenhauer, which delineates the important moral boundaries between right 
and wrong – only, “these boundaries are barricaded on the passive side” (WWR I, 371) by 
threatening the would-be wrongdoer with adverse material consequences. Citizens must accept 
the threat of punishment as part of the political contract, or else they only have each other’s 
word to go on – which, as we know from above, is not worth much. 
 In other words, Schopenhauer advocates a deterrence theory of punishment.21 Indeed, 
he can advocate little else, given some of his other commitments. Retributivism, the theory that 
wrongful actions simply deserve punishment, is ruled out on the grounds that the state has no 
legitimate business in addressing the wrongfulness of citizens’ actions directly, but only their 
harmful consequences to other citizens. Rightful punishment, Schopenhauer says, “has a 
purpose for the future” (WWR I, 375); that is, it aims to prevent future wrongs – or rather the 
suffering from wrongs – from occurring, rather than correct the balance after a wrong has 
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occurred. There is, therefore, also a tone of moral queasiness about Schopenhauer’s views on 
retributivism. Because it falls outside of the rightful scope of law as he sees it, Schopenhauer 
closely identifies retribution with the sheer desire for revenge: “When you retaliate for a wrong 
by inflicting pain without any future purpose, this is revenge … Repaying evil with evil … is 
neither moral nor otherwise justifiable through any rational ground, and the right of retaliation 
… is senseless” (WWR I, 374-375; see also OFW, 112). 
The option of rehabilitation, on the other hand, where the justifying aim of punishment 
is to reform the criminal and restore her back to society, is complicated by certain elements of 
Schopenhauer’s broader moral philosophy. Schopenhauer is very pessimistic about our ability 
to effect a genuine moral reformation in another person: to alter someone’s moral character “is 
much more surely impossible than our being able to transform lead into gold” (OBM, 240).22 
According to Schopenhauer, this is because the unique relative proportions of a given person’s 
separate inclinations to serve her own will (egoism), to serve the will of another as her own 
(compassion), and deliberately to frustrate the will of another as an end in itself (malice), are 
“inborn and ineradicable,” and unchanging throughout her lifetime (see OBM, 235-244).23 This 
theory of moral character is developed in answer to the question of why moral conduct differs 
from person to person with the added difficulty that, according to Schopenhauer, a person’s 
empirical character is merely the revelation of her intelligible character; her own personal 
essence which lies outside of the principle of sufficient reason.24 
Admittedly, further inspired by the Kantian theory of moral character which to a large 
extent informs the theory above, Schopenhauer asserts the existence of “true moral freedom, 
which is of a higher kind” (OFW, 105). According to Schopenhauer, such true moral freedom 
is grasped in the unshakeable responsibility one feels for one’s own moral character itself, lying 
as it does outside of the principle of sufficient reason, as opposed to the actions which flow 
from that character, which are within the domain of deterministic necessity (OFW, 105-109). 
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Exercise of this transcendental freedom is arguably exemplified in Schopenhauer’s theory of 
the sublime and his ascetic moral philosophy, both of which involve the subject in a conscious 
inner struggle against the will.25 However, the very fact that exercise of such freedom is 
ultimately precipitated by these instances of frankly extraordinary internal struggle, may allow 
us to reconcile Schopenhauer’s admission of transcendental freedom with his general 
pessimism about moral reformation: the problem of rehabilitation might be seen more as the 
impossibility of inducing others to take such morally active responsibility for themselves. 
The only form of rehabilitation for which Schopenhauer holds out any positive hope is 
intellectual rehabilitation. It is possible, he thinks, not to change character, but to supply 
character with better knowledge, and thus better motives, so that it might manifest itself in less 
destructive ways. For this reason, Schopenhauer praises the American penitentiary system, 
which, so he believes, “does not intend to improve the heart of the criminal, but merely set his 
head to rights” (OBM, 240; see also WWR I, 597).26 
 The state’s moral and legal right to distribute punishments, as opposed to merely 
threatening punishment as a deterrent, is an instance of the right of compulsion upon a broken 
contract, mentioned above. By means of committing the wrong of injuring another citizen, the 
criminal has committed the additional wrong of breaking her contract with political society. 
By breaking her contract, she forfeits the protection that it affords, and thus opens herself up 
to punishment. Even so, the state’s exercise of the right of compulsion is conditional. 
When a citizen breaks the political contract, it does not directly follow that the state has 
the right or obligation to punish that citizen: as far as it goes, the state’s right of compulsion 
may not be exercised to its full extent, on precisely the same grounds that any right to self-
defense may not be. Furthermore, the range of possible moral and legal justifications that the 
state can give for exercising its right of compulsion in the form of distributing punishment is 
far more limited than, say, a normal citizen’s possible justifications for exercising her right of 
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compulsion in a private matter. Even after discounting revenge and retribution out of hand, 
some possible interests that a private citizen might have in exercising her right of compulsion 
privately, such as the protection of her own life or the restoration of her property, supply her 
with good (albeit defeasible) possible reasons to do so. By contrast, where the decision to 
punish is concerned, the state, at least according to Schopenhauer, has only one morally and 
legally validated interest: deterring wrongdoing in order to protect its citizens from being 
wronged. It follows that the state has the right and obligation to distribute punishments on the 
grounds of the right of compulsion, not absolutely, but only where the distribution of 
punishment would add to the general deterrent – or conversely, where the failure to do so would 
detract from it. 
It is on the latter grounds that Schopenhauer in fact justifies the state’s right and 
obligation to distribute punishments: “If [punishment] fails to have [a deterrent] effect in an 
individual case, it must be implemented, because otherwise it would fail to have it in all future 
cases” (OFW, 112; see also WWR I, 374). The state’s right and obligation to punish follows 
from the separate and primary obligation of the state to protect the people, combined, 
importantly, with the fact that the protective-deterrent function of punishments depends upon 
their being reliably handed down. Thus, the distribution of punishments, too, is future-oriented: 
as a ground for the right to distribute punishments, the state’s moral right to honor a contract 
that was made in the past, while a necessary condition, is still morally and legally incomplete 
without the state’s further obligation to carry the purpose of that contract into the future. 
Here, then, we must reconsider Neil Jordan’s interpretation of Schopenhauer’s 
grounding of the right to distribute punishments, or at least one reading of his interpretation. 
Jordan seems to imply that the state is armed with the right to punish, and burdened with the 
duty to do so, solely on the grounds of “the fulfilment of the law as a contract” (WWR I, 374). 
To this extent, Jordan argues that Schopenhauer’s theory of punishment is an anticipation of 
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H. L. A. Hart’s hybridized two-stage theory of punishment, where the “general justifying aim” 
of punishment is utilitarian in its concern for harm-reduction, whereas the distribution of 
punishment – that is, who actually deserves to be punished and in what amount – is decided on 
retributivist grounds.27 However, the comparison is not quite fitting.  
Firstly, as Schopenhauer repeatedly stresses in his disdain for retributivism, it is not 
within the state’s moral and legal remit to punish wrongfulness as such. There is no reason to 
think that this changes after punishment has failed as a deterrent in the particular case. Thus, 
the state is not obliged to punish the criminal just because she broke her contract with the state. 
Rather, as above, the state is morally and legally bound only to protect its citizens from being 
wronged, and forcible fulfillment of the law as contract, including punishment, is the socially 
and legally agreed means by which this is done. 
Secondly, there are not two separate stages to Schopenhauer’s theory of punishment, 
one forward-looking (and utilitarian), the other backward-looking (and quasi-retributivist). 
Schopenhauer is just as plain about the exclusive forward orientation of truly moral and legal 
punishment as he is about its (related) non-retributivism: “The law and its implementation 
[emphasis added], i.e. punishment, are essentially directed to the future, not the past” (WWR 
I, 374). Accordingly, Schopenhauer’s theory of punishment is forward-looking from beginning 
to end. Before the commission of her crime, punishment relates to the criminal as it does to 
any other citizen, as a threat aimed at deterring her future crime. After her crime, it continues 
to have the same relationship toward her and the rest of society, only now, through her 
punishment, she has additionally become the necessary and rightful means of sustaining this 
general relationship in a way that law-abiding citizens have not.28 It is, of course, an important 
necessary condition of her rightful punishment that the criminal has broken her contract (more 
on which shortly). However, breaking her contract is not ultimately the reason why her 
punishment is morally and legally correct. 
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Rather than anticipating Hart’s two-stage theory of punishment, then, at least in one 
respect, Schopenhauer provides a theoretically superior alternative to it. One objection to 
theories of punishment such as Hart’s is their ad hoc opportunism, borrowing from one theory 
of punishment in order to shore up one intuition about punishment, and from another theory to 
shore up a different intuition – with unsatisfyingly little concern for their mutual coherence.29 
By contrast, Schopenhauer manages to evade this problem, while accounting for both the 
general purpose of punishment and its rightful implementation in particular cases, by 
repurposing his general theory of punishment rather than subdividing it. 
Nevertheless, there is a different objection, the avoidance of which is usually seen as 
the key advantage of Hart’s hybridization of deterrentism with retributivism. A common 
objection to deterrence theories of punishment in particular is their liability to grant the state 
permission to inflict undeserved punishments upon its citizens in order to obtain the absolute 
maximum deterrent.30 Strikingly, however, Schopenhauer’s staunchly deterrentist theory gets 
around even this objection – and once again it is on the grounds that the state’s right to punish 
does not float freely of the terms and purpose of the political contract that engenders that right. 
First, as explained above, even though it does not justify punishment, breaking the 
political contract is a necessary condition of punishment. This ensures that punishment of the 
innocent is impermissible. Second, as with all instances of the right of compulsion, the right to 
distribute punishment, when exercised, is morally constrained in proportion to the extent of the 
criminal’s wrongdoing: it permits no more than reaffirmation of the will – expressed, in this 
case, by the terms of the political contract – that was violated by the original legal wrong. This 
formally ensures that over-punishment of the guilty is impermissible. Third and finally, 
according to Schopenhauer the “pledge” made by each citizen upon entering into the political 
contract “must be appropriate to the value of that for which it answers” (WWR II, 597-598). 
In other words, no one may be asked to lay down in return for the protection of any particular 
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right, security, or freedom, anything more than that particular protection is worth. Therefore: 
“everyone is justified in demanding as a pledge the life of another, as a guarantee for the 
security of his own, but not for the security of his property, for which the freedom and so forth 
of another is a sufficient pledge” (WWR II, 598). This substantively ensures that over-
punishment of the guilty is impermissible. Thus, the state’s right to punish is limited. 
 These considerations, like so many above, are as prudent as they are moral and legal. 
On the one hand, morally and legally speaking, if the proper purpose of punishment is limited 
to deterrence, then merely extracting “a sufficient pledge” in each case of wrong, as opposed 
to the maximum pledge in every case, is all that is necessary; and to punish more than is strictly 
necessary to deter would be to punish more than is morally and legally right. Schopenhauer 
follows this logic through consistently – and fairly – by claiming that, “where possible, the 
apparent suffering of the punishment should exceed the actual” (WWR II, 597), since it is 
ultimately the apparent severity of the punishment that deters the public. 
On the other hand, however, making merely a sufficient pledge is the most that could 
be expected of a prudent rational egoist entering the political contract. Why pledge more? 
Jordan emphasizes, and is impressed by, the moral character of Schopenhauer’s theory of 
punishment – and, moreover, the moral character of the state according to Schopenhauer – on 
the grounds just given above: that for Schopenhauer the state’s right to threaten and distribute 
punishment is not only licensed but is also limited, at the correct points, by the morally binding 
political contract upon which it is founded.31 However, to grant the state a truly moral character 
on these grounds is to overplay them. No doubt, the truly good state observes the pure doctrine 
of right – what it requires, allows, and disallows – as do truly good citizens, for that matter. 
Nevertheless, as is evident throughout the above, as far as Schopenhauer’s political philosophy 
is concerned, no motivation is given for observing the pure doctrine of right which cannot be 
reduced to non-moral, prudential, egoistic reasons. Moreover, there is no good reason to think 
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that the state itself is any more capable than its citizens of observing justice for its own sake. 
If anything, the state should be expected to be just as incapable; it is, after all, ultimately 
composed out of its citizens. Hence, foreseeing this problem, in order to protect the people 
from the excesses of the state, Schopenhauer advocates a “dividing and separating … of the 
protective power, the legislature, the judicature, and the executive” (WWR II, 595) – a morally 
important measure, perhaps, but a prudentially motivated one surely.32 
 
Schopenhauer’s minimal state  
 
With Schopenhauer’s political philosophy now in view, it is worth taking a step back to 
appreciate briefly, first, just how astonishingly minimal is its conception of the state; and 
second, just how far we can supposedly be taken on the strength of rational egoism alone. 
 On the first count, let us recollect the ways, all mentioned above, in which the state 
according to Schopenhauer is not a morally significant phenomenon. The state: (1) is not 
morally motivated in its foundation or in its operations; (2) is not necessarily, and in many 
cases not typically, obeyed on moral grounds; (3) does not, and cannot, legitimately concern 
itself directly with the inner moral significance of any of its citizen’s behaviors, even when 
they do wrong;33 and (4) does not, and cannot, genuinely morally educate, improve, or reform 
its citizens. We may add to this two further claims, which Schopenhauer appears to derive from 
some or all of the first four, that: (5) “Still more mistaken is the theory that the state is the 
condition for freedom in a moral sense, and thus a condition for morality” (WWR I, 371); and 
(6) “From this standpoint one clearly sees the narrow-mindedness and shallowness of the 
philosophasters who in pompous phrases depict the state as the highest purpose and the 
blossom of human existence” (PP II, 219) – two obvious swipes at Hegelianism.34 
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 And yet, if all goes to plan, the state performs a crucially important function. In spite 
of the above, temporal justice, through its delicate balancing of egoistic forces and prudential 
measures, achieves nothing more or less than the welcome semblance of voluntary justice:  
 
When the state fully achieves its goal, it will present the same appearance that would be 
expected if perfect justice governed everybody’s disposition … In the latter case … the 
situation would be that nobody wanted to do wrong; but in the former case it would be 
that nobody wanted to be wronged, with the means to this fully in effect. So the same 
line can be drawn from opposite directions, and a predator with a muzzle is just as 
harmless as a grass eating animal (WWR I, 372). 
 
Schopenhauer reuses this apt final image of muzzled predators (OBM, 189; PP II, 192-193). 
Elsewhere, however, he uses different imagery that is equally powerful: “It is conceivable that 
all crime could be prevented by a perfect state … Politically, much would be gained – morally, 
nothing at all, just that life would be less of a mirror to the will” (WWR I, 396).35 
 Hence, although the function of the state is to rein in the harmful consequences of 
egoism, Schopenhauer’s political philosophy is far from anti-egoistic. Just the opposite:  
 
The state is so far from being directed against egoism in general and as such, that the 
reverse is in fact true: the state emerges out of a cumulative, collective egoism that is 
fully aware of itself as such, and proceeds methodically from a one-sided standpoint to 
that of the universal (WWR I, 372). 
 
 We might object, however, that Schopenhauer ought to be much warier of the state that 
is founded on egoism – or more precisely: the state that is founded squarely on the fear of being 
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wronged, and constructed solely out of principles of external protection, as a surrogate for 
internal principles of just forbearance. As I shall now argue, contrary to Schopenhauer’s 
expectations, a state such as this is unlikely to achieve even the semblance of moral justice. 
 
Contracts, impartiality, and power 
 
Contractarian normative theory, understood as a form of social contract theory that emphasizes 
and utilizes egoistic concerns such as mutual interest and mutual threat, and which historically 
derives from Hobbes, is subject to a major criticism which Nicholas Southwood calls “the 
impartiality objection.”36 The structure and claims of Schopenhauer’s political philosophy, 
which is clearly a form of contractarianism, make it exceptionally vulnerable to this objection. 
 The impartiality objection to contractarianism is essentially that the rational egoist lacks 
the motivation to form certain contracts with individuals or groups who are significantly less 
powerful than herself, because in forming such contracts she stands to lose more in restrictions 
to her personal rights and liberties than she gains in additional protection, security or benefits.37 
Historically, such relatively powerless groups, with whom more powerful rational egoists have 
no motivation to form contracts, have included: the poor in relation to the rich, women in 
relation to men, the mentally and physically disabled in relation to the able-minded and able-
bodied, certain ethnic groups in relation to certain other ethnic groups, certain religious groups 
in relation to certain other religious groups, and non-human animals in relation to humans.38 
Few would argue that exclusion of some or all these groups is tolerable, and so contractarianism 
fails “to get morality’s extensional character right,” as Southwood puts it.39 
 Facing this objection, matters are made worse for Schopenhauer by the fact that, 
following Hobbes, the contractarianism of his political philosophy is exclusively motivated by 
the “mutual fear of mutual force,” ignoring the mutual benefits of mutual cooperation that other 
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contractarians have cared to emphasize.40 However, in fact, the specific and fatal relevance of 
the impartiality objection to Schopenhauer’s political philosophy lies in the challenge that it 
poses to Schopenhauer’s own expectation, mentioned above, that the perfect implementation 
of temporal justice would be more or less co-extensive with the perfect collective realization 
of voluntary justice. On closer inspection, we find that where the compassionate virtue of 
voluntary justice would pull behavior in one direction, the egoistic contractarianism of 
temporal justice pulls it back in the other. 
 Behavior toward animals is a case in point. Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy is 
celebrated for its progressive stance toward animals. Indeed, Schopenhauer uses “the fact that 
it also takes animals into its protection,” when prevailing moral codes did not, as evidence for 
his basic thesis that compassion is the only genuinely moral incentive for action (OBM, 226). 
“Compassion for animals,” Schopenhauer says, “goes together with goodness of character so 
precisely that we can confidently assert that anyone who is cruel to animals cannot be a good 
human being” (OBM, 229). For this reason, he expresses his admiration for societies for the 
protection of animals, which were beginning to be founded in his day – in particular, the 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, in Great Britain, which later became the 
RSPCA (OBM, 230-231). 
However, the contractarianism spelled out in Schopenhauer’s political philosophy does 
not seem fit to protect animals from the wrongs that he himself claims compassion would spare 
them. This is in spite of Schopenhauer’s no doubt true assertion that the general protection of 
animals “can only be effective with the help of law and police” (OBM, 229), and his own 
personal admiration for the then growing tendency of British courts to punish animal cruelty 
with fines (OBM, 230). The fact is that even if the very notion of contractual agreement does 
not immediately exclude animals from the sphere of legal protection, and one were to employ 
a more imaginative and inclusive conception of what contracts require and between whom they 
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can be formed, still the human rational egoist stands to lose far more than she would gain in 
forming contracts with animals. In fact, in terms of Schopenhauer’s primary political good of 
legal protection from being wronged herself, the rational egoist stands to gain nothing at all. 
Thus, with regard to animals, even the perfect implementation of temporal justice is not 
coextensive with the perfect collective realization of voluntary justice. Instead, a political 
society that cares about animals must act out of compassion. 
 Similarly, Schopenhauer is laudably critical of the unjust domination and oppression 
of human beings that was happening in his mid-nineteenth-century world – in particular, the 
African slave trade and the widespread immiseration of the proletariat.41 The “remote cause” 
of both of these evils, Schopenhauer avers, is the dominant classes’ desire for luxury: “as long 
as luxury exists on the one hand, then necessarily on the other excessive work and a bad life 
must exist, be it under the name of poverty, slavery, of proletarians, or of slaves,” since “in 
order for a few people to have what is dispensable, superfluous and refined … a great portion 
of existing human powers must be expended upon them and withdrawn from what is necessary” 
(PP II, 221-222).42 Schopenhauer’s censure of these kinds of luxury industries and their moral 
costs is perfectly in keeping with his pure doctrine of right: the very definition of wrong is to 
pursue one’s own interests to the detriment of someone else’s interests. It will also be recalled 
that slavery in particular is listed by Schopenhauer as a prime example of moral wrongdoing. 
And yet, again, on these matters it is difficult to see how, if placed in the relevant 
position of power, the behavior of the rational egoist of Schopenhauer’s political philosophy 
would be consistent with her behavior were she acting from voluntary justice. For, as history 
seems to show,43 certain contracts that the rational egoist finds prudent to form with parties 
who are equal to her in independent material wealth and power, she does not find prudent to 
form with parties who are not materially her equal, who thereby pose a relatively limited threat, 
and from whose maltreatment she stands to profit far more than if she refrains. 
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In the following poignant passage, which again relates to slavery and exploited workers, 
Schopenhauer even makes a slip in the direction of the above conclusion, by observing a pattern 
that seems to reveal a truth much deeper than he intends: 
 
In general, … the conduct of men towards one another is characterized as a rule by 
injustice, extreme unfairness, hardness, and even cruelty … The necessity of the State 
and for legislation rests on this fact … But in all cases not lying within the reach of the 
law, we see at once a lack of consideration for his like which is peculiar to man, and 
springs from his boundless egoism, and sometimes even from malice. How man deals 
with man is seen, for example, in Negro slavery, the ultimate object of which is sugar 
and coffee. However, we need not go so far; to enter at the age of five a cotton-spinning 
or other factory, and from then on to sit there every day first ten, then twelve, and finally 
fourteen hours, and perform the same mechanical work, is to purchase dearly the pleasure 
of drawing breath. But this is the fate of millions, and many more have an analogous fate 
(WWR II, 578, translation modified, emphasis added). 
 
The significance of Schopenhauer’s observation about these cases of exploitation “not lying 
within the reach of the law” is open to different interpretations. All that Schopenhauer means 
to imply is that exploitative behavior reliably occurs when it happens to be permitted by 
contemporary legal practice – a testament to the predatory opportunism of human nature. But 
the regular coincidence of legal oversight with open exploitation which Schopenhauer astutely 
notices here may be evidence, not just of egoistic motivation, but of a systemic connection. 
Indeed, what Schopenhauer may be observing is the manifestation of a descriptive behavioral 
principle which derives from the rationality of his own political philosophy: that certain 
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exploitative behaviors are left lying outside the reach of law as a result of “a lack of 
consideration for his like which is peculiar to man.” 
 A final example of how, given certain historically real power inequalities, the rational 
egoism of temporal justice is unlikely to map onto the compassionate virtue of temporal justice, 
is an issue that finds Schopenhauer far on the wrong side of the tracks: the position of women. 
In contrast to his righteous (if politically undermined) critiques above, Schopenhauer’s stance 
on women is woefully reactionary. At one point in his misogynistic essay “On women” (PP II, 
550-561), while discussing the relatively improved position of women in his contemporary 
European society, this manifests itself in a perfect example of the likely attitude of the rational 
egoist in the seat of power:  
 
It would be highly desirable if Europe … assigned this No. 2 of the human race her 
natural position once again, and put a stop to this lady-nonsense about which not only all 
of Asia is laughing, but Greece and Rome would have laughed in the same way; the 
results in the social, civil and political context would be incalculably beneficial (PP II, 
557). 
 




If the contractarian structure of temporal justice is designed to act as an external safeguard 
against transgressions of the pure doctrine of right, then it does so very imperfectly. Let us not 
forget, however, that the pure doctrine of right as such naturally lends itself to the moral 
criticism of exploitative behaviors, as demonstrated by Schopenhauer’s own progressive 
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applications of it to contemporary social and political issues. Indeed, given the political reality 
towards which the rational egoism of temporal justice is inclined to lead us, it is just as well 
that according to Schopenhauer the normative content of the concepts of wrong and right comes 
from outside of politics altogether. For, this allows that although the state is not morally 
motivated, is not morally obeyed, and indeed is not legitimately directly concerned with 
morality at all, its exploits, or the exploits that it permits, can still be held to external moral 
standards. 
 But how far does this really get us? The cruel irony to which the impartiality objection 
points is that relatively powerless and vulnerable groups, by nature, have little to nothing to 
offer materially in return for their own much needed protection. If this is what truly matters 
politically, then what use is a compelling moral argument? Surely it will fall on deaf ears. 
 Here, however, we might console ourselves that Schopenhauer’s way of distinguishing 
between politics and morality at least has explanatory value. To a certain extent, the isolated 
moral argument for political change falling on deaf ears is descriptively accurate. Which is 
why, historically, we rarely find progressive political movements making the moral case alone. 
Instead, we also find public demonstration, civil disobedience, strikes, springs, uprisings, and 
even violence – the kinds of organized action that Schopenhauer discovered on his doorstep on 
18 September, 1848. These methods of political protest do not merely draw attention to the 
importance of the moral case which may (or may not) validate them, if indeed they do at all. 
Rather, they aim to demonstrate, or force, political society’s material reliance on making more 
equitable contracts with a given group of its members – a message that the rational egoist hears 
and can understand, albeit is not guaranteed to appreciate. Interpreting political normativity 
and moral normativity as having related but ultimately separate sources, along the lines 
suggested by Schopenhauer, helps us to explain this historically repeated strategical dynamic. 
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